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Abstract. In this study, we examine the behavior and profitability of
modern malware that mines cryptocurrency. Unlike previous studies, we
look at the cryptocurrency market as a whole, rather than just Bitcoin.
We not only consider PCs, but also mobile phones, and IoT devices. In
the past few years, criminals have attacked all these platforms for the
purpose of cryptocurrency mining. The question is: how much money do
they make? It is common knowledge that mining Bitcoin is now very
difficult, so why do the criminals even target low-end devices for mining
purposes? By analyzing the most important families of malicious cryp-
tocurrency miners that were active between 2014 and 2017, we are able
to report how they work, which currency they mine, and how profitable
it is to do so. We will see that the evolution of the cryptocurrency market
with many new cryptocurrencies that are still CPU minable and offer
better privacy to criminals and have contributed to making mining mal-
ware attractive again—with attackers generating a continuous stream of
profit that in some cases may reach in the millions.
Keywords: malware, cryptocurrency mining, mobile phone, IoT
1 Introduction
A cryptocurrency is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of exchange.
Bitcoin [19] became the first decentralized cryptocurrency in 2009. By design,
cryptocurrencies need significant computational processing to validate transac-
tions and add them to a distributed ledger (the blockchain), and networks of
so-called miners therefore set themselves to the task of maintaining the work-
ing of Bitcoin. Incentivized by financial reward, cryptocurrency miners uphold
the network by validating transactions. The financial reward serves as a com-
pensation for the computing power needed to execute the aforementioned tasks.
However, if one could steal or borrow computing power from others, the finan-
cial reward would grow significantly, since the system would generate income at
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little or no cost to the benificiary. This is what motivated cyber criminals to
experiment, as early as 2009, with using botnets of infected machines as silent
cryptocurrency miners to maximize their profits.
For some time, in the days that banking trojans such as GameOver Zeus ruled
cyber crime [33], cryptocurrency mining gained a certain amount of popularity
among cyber criminals who were, after all, already in the business of compro-
mising PCs and herding large numbers of them in botnets. In those days, we
saw the first criminals infecting machines exclusively to steal CPU resources to
mine Bitcoins on their behalf. However, after a few years already, the profits of
the Bitcoin mining botnets dwindled as the mining became too difficult for reg-
ular machines and Bitcoin mining botnets fell into decline. Analyses by security
companies in 2014 suggested that malicious miners are not profitable on PC and
certainly not on mobile devices [15].
Banking trojans and later also ransomware became the cyber criminals’
workhorses. Both have drawbacks. For instance, cashout is tricky and researchers
have shown that it is possible to trace even Bitcoin transactions [30,13,17].
Switching to more privacy-preserving currencies such as Monero or Zcash is
not easy, because in many countries it is not possible to buy such currencies
with normal bank accounts. Moreover, both banking trojans and ransomware
tend to be noisy—users notice when money is stolen. After the theft, most bots
are burned, as users clean up their systems to prevent further damage.
Botnets of cryptocurrency miners have no such disadvantages. A bot can
easily mine privacy-preserving currencies, to make all profits untraceable. The
theft is also stealthy, as no money transfers from the user’s bank account. The
cost to the user is in a higher electricity bill and reduced computing performance.
Moreover, rather than a one-time hit, the cryptocurrency miner can generate a
continuous stream of income.
Finally, one main cause of the decline of cryptocurrency malware has disap-
peared: it is now profitable to mine cryptocurrencies with regular CPUs again.
New cryptocurrencies are introduced all the time and, unlike Bitcoin, these are
still mineable without specialized hardware. In fact, in this paper, we will show
that even low-end IoT devices are interesting targets for crypto mining. The
market now counts over 1,500 cryptocurrencies, out of which more than 600 see
active trade. At the time of writing, they represent over 50% of the cryptocur-
rency market.
As many of these coins are CPU mineable and provide better privacy, the
research question we ask is the following: has cryptocurrency mining become
attractive to cyber criminals again?
To answer this question, we perform the first scientific study of the phe-
nomenon of malicious cryptocurrency mining that goes beyond Bitcoin. Like the
McAfee report [15] from 2014, a more narrow study by Huang et al. [11] of mali-
cious Bitcoin miners between 2011 and 2013 found that Bitcoin mining was only
marginally profitable. In the 3 years that followed, Bitcoin mining has become so
hard that without specialized hardware, it is no longer practical at all. However,
the world has changed and the number of alternative currencies has exploded.
In a single sentence in the conclusions, Huang et al. [11] speculated that such a
change may make the mining activities profitable again, but leave this for future
work. In this paper, we examine such alternative coins. We will look at malware
in the wild by analyzing existing malicious cryptocurrency miners targeting dif-
ferent platforms for different currencies, and provide methods to detect them.
We will see that in 2017 alone, four new families of malicious cryptocurrency
miners have emerged. None of them mine Bitcoin. Moreover, we investigate to
what extent the evolution of the cryptocurrency market made mining malware
more practical and profitable. Our study shows that it makes economic sense for
attackers to invest in this type of activity.
Contributions We make the following contributions:
– We study how the growth of the cryptocurrency market and the growth in
computation power of devices favors malicious cryptocurrency miners.
– We asses the profitability of a criminal business models using malicious cryp-
tocurrency miners, its likeliness of occurrence and impact.
– We analyze existing malicious cryptocurrency miners to understand how
they spread, what payload they use and how the cashout happens.
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce and describe the basic terminology of cryptocurrrency mining. Section 3
includes a detailed analysis of our data set of malicious cryptocurrencies that
exist in the wild. A discussion on our findings and, importantly, an outlook for
the future and detection mechanisms are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we
provide a brief overview of the literature review and finally conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2 Background on Cryptocurrencies
A cryptocurrency is a medium of exchange much like the euro or the dollar,
except that it uses cryptography and blockchain technology to control the cre-
ation of monetary units and to verify the transaction of a fund. Bitcoin [19] was
the first such decentralized digital currency. A cryptocurrency user can transfer
money to another user by forming a transaction record and committing it to a
distributed write-only database called blockchain. The blockchain is maintained
by a peer-to-peer network of miners. A miner collects transaction data from the
network, validates it and inserts into the blockchain in the form of a block. When
a miner successfully adds a valid block to the blockchain, the network compen-
sates the miner with cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoins). In the case of Bitcoin, this
process is called Bitcoin mining and this is how new Bitcoins enter circulation.
Bitcoin transactions are protected with cryptographic techniques that ensure
only the rightful owner of a Bitcoin address can transfer funds from it.
Since Bitcoin was created in 2009, around 1500 other types of cryptocurren-
cies have been introduced [9]. We commonly refer to these cryptocurrencies as al-
ternative coins—altcoins, for short. Like Bitcoin, altcoins also use the blockchain
technology and have a similar reward mechanism. However, each altcoin differs
in other characteristics, such as speed, traceability, and security. For instance,
the Monero altcoin provides more privacy than any other currently existing cryp-
tocurrency. With major industrial players such as J.P Morgan Chase, Microsoft,
Intel, and Google backing some of these cryptocurrencies, altcoins are increas-
ingly popular. Today, altcoins such as Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, Dash and
Monero together make up a little over 50 percent of the total cryptocurrency
market [3] while the rest is owned by Bitcoin.
2.1 Cryptocurrency Mining
To add a block (i.e., a collection of transaction data) to the blockchain, a miner
has to solve a cryptographic puzzle based on the block. This mechanism prevents
malicious nodes from trying to add bogus blocks to the blockchain and earn the
reward illegitimately. A valid block in the blockchain contains a solution to a
cryptographic puzzle that involves the hash of the previous block, the hash of
the transactions in the current block, and a wallet address to credit with the
reward.
In accordance with Satoshi Nakamoto’s original Bitcoin paper [19], the puz-
zle is designed such that the probability of finding a solution by a miner is
proportional to the computational power. Additionally, the difficulty of solving
the puzzle increases with the length of the blockchain. Consequently, a situation
arose where mining for Bitcoin using a regular CPU was no longer profitable. In-
stead, miners started using, specialized mining hardware in ASICs and FPGAs.
2.2 Cryptocurrency Mining Pools
As mentioned, the probability of mining a block is proportional to the compu-
tational resources used for solving the associated cryptographic puzzle. Due to
the nature of the mining process, the interval between mining events exhibits
high variance from the point of view of a single miner. In other words, a single
home miner using a dedicated ASIC is unlikely to mine a block for years. Con-
sequently, miners typically organize themselves into mining pools. All members
of a pool work together to mine each block, and share the revenue when one of
them successfully mines a block.
The mining pool server assigns jobs to its members. To prove that a miner is
contributing to solving the ultimate cryptographic puzzle, a miner submits this
solution in the form of shares to the pool server. The pool server rewards the
miner in proportion to the submitted number of valid shares.
2.3 Pool Mining Protocol
The protocol used by miners to reliably and efficiently fetch jobs from mining
pool servers is known as Stratum [2]. It is a clear-text communication protocol
built over TCP/IP, using a JSON-RPC format. Stratum prescribes that miners
who want to join the mining pool first send a subscription message, describ-
ing the miner’s capability in terms of computational resources. The pool server
then responds with a subscription response message, and the miner sends an
authorization request message with its username and password. After successful
authorization, the pool sends a difficulty notification that is proportional to the
capability of the miner—ensuring that low-end machines get easier jobs (puz-
zles) than high-end ones. Throughout this paper we will use the term high-end
machine to describe a PC and low-end machine to describe both mobile de-
vices and IoT devices, and Stratum ensures that even low-end machines may
contribute to the mining process. Finally, the pool server assigns these jobs by
means of job notifications. Once the miner finds a solution it sends the solution
in the form of a share to the pool server. The pool server rewards the miner in
proportional to the number of valid shares it submitted and the difficulty of the
jobs.
For instance, a user with a low-end machine will receive a low difficulty, which
means its miner solves puzzles with low difficulty. A high-end machine, on the
other hand, should not solve such easy puzzles, because doing so would over-
whelm the pool server with large numbers of shares per second. Instead, it will
receive more difficult challenges that take approximately the same time as easy
challenges on the low-end machine. Irrespective of a machine’s computational
power, the miner’s reward will be proportional to the number of valid shares
and their difficulty.
3 Malicious Miners
We created a collection of malicious cryptocurrency miners for different plat-
forms (PC, mobile/Android, and IoT). Specifically, we collected 197 samples
of 8 different families, which we believe are practically all the active families
of malicious cryptocurrency miners in our evaluation period. We received the
samples from VirusTotal4 (VT) and made a manual effort to ensure that we
did not miss any relevant families, by analyzing as many blogs and forums that
discuss crypto miners as we could find [21,29] and downloading all the samples
based on the hashes mentioned in them. The majority of our dataset comprises
of cryptocurrency miners that were active during the period of 2014–(August)
2017.
For PC platforms, we analyzed BitcoinMiner.J, Mal/Miner-C, BitCoin-
Miner.hxao and Adylkuzz that target Windows, as well as SambaCry which
targets Linux. For the mobile platform, we studied samples of the Kagecoin and
BadLepricon families, which are affecting Android users. Lastly, we added an
IoT-based malicious cryptocurrency miner named Shell.Miner, which appeared
in 2017 and affected a variety of IoT devices. Table 1 provides an overview of
our dataset.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the characteristics of the malware
samples in our experimental dataset and discuss how these characteristics are
evolving along with the cryptocurrency economy, as well as with the computation
power of both high- and low-end devices.
4 https://www.virustotal.com
Table 1: Our experimental dataset
Family Target Platform VT: first seen VT: last analyzed
BitcoinMiner.J PC (Windows) 2009 2017
Mal/Miner-c PC (Windows) 2014 2017
Kagecoin Android 2014 2017
BitcoinMiner.hxao PC (Windows) 2016 2017
BadLepricon Android 2017 2017
Adylkuzz PC (Windows) 2017 2017
Sambacry PC (Linux) 2017 2017
Shell.Miner IoT 2017 2017
3.1 Cryptocurrency mining on PCs
BitcoinMiner.J, Mal/Miner-c, BitCoinMiner.hxao, Adylkuzz and Sambacry
are the main malicious cryptocurrency miner families that were actively targeting
Windows and Linux OS from the year 2009 onward.
BitcoinMiner.J and BitCoinMiner.hxao use social engineering and phish-
ing techniques to infect machines, while Mal/Miner-c and Adylkuzz use a worm
component to spread and exploit other machines in the same network. Specifi-
cally, Mal/Miner-c exploits a design flaw in Seagate Central device [29] to infect
other machines in the same network, and Adylkuzz uses the exploit for Microsoft
SMB vulnerability [26] dumped by the Shadow Brokers in the beginning of 2017.
Similarly, SambaCry targets Linux machines exploiting a vulnerability in an older
version of Samba [7].
Coin mining The Mal/Miner-c malware contains three components that
can be used for mining Monero (XMR) coins: NSCpuCNMine32.exe, NSCpuC-
NMine64.exe and NSGpuCNMine.exe. After inspecting the CPU type and GPU
of the victim’s device, it selects the most suitable one to mine coins efficiently.
Through manual analysis and code comparison, we discovered that, in gen-
eral, the miner components are just obfuscated versions of CPUminer and are
freely available5. Prior to mining, the miner downloads a configuration file from
the C&C server. This file contains pool server details that the miner should use
and the address of the wallet to which the mined coins should be credited. More-
over, the miner uses the Stratum protocol to communicate with the pool server
of a mining pool. These mining pools are legitimate mining pools that can be
used by anyone willing to contribute their computation power to mine coins.
The cryptocurrency miner version of Adylkuzz surfaced only around May
2017. Through manual analysis of all available samples, we discovered that the
miner component of this malware is a packed version of CPUminer (version
2.3.3), which is open source. After the infection has taken place, the miner con-
tacts the C&C server for the configuration file, which contains information on
5 https://Bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=647251.0
what coin to mine and which pool server to use. This miner was also min-
ing (privacy-friendly) Monero coins by connecting to a legitimate Monero pool
server. Moreover, it had two versions of the miner embedded in the binary, one
for 32-bit systems and another for 64-bit systems.
The BitcoinMiner.hxao cryptocurrency miner uses social engineering and
phishing techniques to infect users. After infecting the device, the main com-
ponent of the malware installs the miner component as a Windows background
service. By reverse engineering the available samples, we discovered that this
miner component is MinerGate Admin edition6, which is mining software for
MinerGate mining pool users. Even though the pool supports various altcoins,
the malware is configured to mine the same untraceable Monero coins. Anyone
can register to this pool using a valid email address. Then, to mine a cryptocur-
rency, the user can run this mining software on any device by just specifying
her email and the pool URL. Finally, the user can withdraw the mined coins
from her wallet address by signing into her pool account. While we found the
email address that is being used by these malware samples, without knowing the
password of the account, we cannot find how much Monero this group of cyber
criminals managed to mine.
The Sambacry cryptocurrency miner takes over Linux servers to also mine
Monero coins by exploiting a Samba remote code execution vulnerability. After
successful execution on the server, it installs a backdoor which gives the attacker
shell access to the server. Using this access, the attacker uploads and execute two
files: INAebsGB.so and cblRWuoCc.so. The INAebsGB.so file makes sure that
the attacker has a persistent access to the machine. Meanwhile, the other file
- cblRWuoCc.so, downloads the open source version of CPUminer. The wallet
address where the mined coins should be added and the pool server that should
to be used by the miner were hard-coded in the binary. Using these information,
an analyst could find how many coins this malware mined so far.
Cash out Prior research [29] on Mal/Miner-c aimed to find out how many
coins the malicious miner was able to mine using the APIs provided by the
Monero pool server. According to the author, the mining pool paid 58,577 Mon-
ero (XMR) to the attacker’s wallet. Note that, when the malicious attack was
launched, the price of one XMR was 1.5 USD and at the time of writing this
paper (September 1, 2017), one XMR was valued at 140 USD—making the value
of the mined XMR by this campaign some 8,200,780 USD, today.
Moreover, an independent investigation on BitcoinMiner.hxao [16] showed
that a campaign managed to mine 2,289 XMR which is equivalent to 320,460
USD today.
Another study [21] analyzed Adylkuzz and estimated that a campaign which
took place in 2017 managed to mine 1,570 XMR using 3 different wallet addresses
in a period of three weeks. However, there is a high probability that there might
be more campaigns that are using different wallet addresses. Hence there is no
6 https://minergate.com/downloads/admin
certainty about the total coins mined by Adylkuzz. Today, the value of the
Monero coins mined by this campaign is at least 220,000 USD.
Lastly, according to [14], SambaCry mined 98 XMR in a month using a single
wallet address. To date, the value of the Monero coins mined by this campaign
is 13,720 USD.
3.2 Cryptocurrency mining on Android
BadLepricon and Kagecoin were two cryptocurrency miner families targeting
Android and whose apps were found in the Google Play store disguised as wallpa-
per apps. Additionally, a version of Kagecoin spread through third-party stores
as a repackaged app.
Coin mining Based on the samples from our dataset, we found that BadLepri-
con was mining Bitcoins whereas Kagecoin focused on altcoins such as Litecoin,
Dogecoin and Casinocoin. Different cryptocurrencies use different proof-of-work
(PoW) algorithms, hence the apps need to implement these algorithms in or-
der to mine for that particular coin. All the mining apps for Android available
today are using the open source version of CPUminer that supports different
PoW algorithms. Moreover, in the case of Android, we observed that to reduce
the overhead, cyber criminals combine it with open source CPU miner code for
ARM, which they embed in apps as native code.
After fulfilling the advertised functionalities of the app, BadLepricon enters
into an infinite loop where every five seconds it checks the battery level, net-
work connectivity, and the display status (to see if the phone’s display is on).
While it almost seems as if it performs these checks as a courtesy to the user’s
phone, in reality it helps the malware to fly under the radar and survive longer.
Firstly, when left unsupervised, mining algorithms can damage a phone by using
excessive processing power which ultimately burns out the device. In order to
avoid this, BadLepricon makes sure that the battery level is running at over 50
percent capacity, the display is turned off, and the phone network connectivity
is on. Secondly, monitoring the phone’s battery status is a good way of hiding
your activities. BadLepricon also uses the WakeLock permission—an Android
feature that makes sure the phone does not go to sleep even when the display is
turned off.
For Kagecoin, the miner component starts as a background service. Since
cryptocurrency mining is a CPU intensive operation, it could run down the
battery of the device very quickly. The first version of Kagecoin (ANDROIDOS -
KAGECOIN.HBT) did not have any mechanism to hide this behaviour from the
user. However, the second version of the malware only mines when the phone
is in its charging state, so that most users will be oblivious to any suspicious
activities taking place on their device.
Cash out In order to control millions of bots, the malware author may use
a proxy to set up one point of contact. BadLepricon uses a Stratum mining
proxy [28] that allows an attacker to change mining pools dynamically. This
makes it difficult for analysts to find out the attacker’s wallet address. Even
so, Kagecoin uses a different strategy—it has a component to update the con-
figuration of the bot which describes the coin to be mined, the attacker wallet
address and the pool to which to connect. In either case, the attacker consol-
idates the mined coins in a single wallet and then exchanges them for money
using cryptocurrency exchanges.
3.3 Cryptocurrency mining in the IoT
While going through the samples downloaded from VirusTotal, we found a family
of malware explicitly targeting Raspberry Pi devices. This malware was first
uploaded to VirusTotal in August 2017. Kaspersky classified it as Shell.Miner.
As a side note, in 2014 Symantec reported a malicious cryptocurrency miner
version called Darlloz 7 which also targetted IoT devices—more specifically, IP
cameras. However, we were unable to find a sample of this malware for our
analysis today.
To facilitate its propagation, Shell.Miner scans the IoT network for Rasp-
berry Pi devices that are using default usernames and passwords. After pwning
the device, it installs the open source version of CPU miner and then changes
the password.
Coin mining Through manual analysis, we found that Shell.Miner uses a
popular open source miner called cpuminer-multi to mine Monero cryptocur-
rency. We also found the pool information and the attacker’s wallet address
which are hardcoded in the shell script. The pool server used by this malware is
xmr.crypto-pool.fr (Figure 1).
We used a feature provided by the pool server to find out how many XMR
were rewarded to this address by the mining pool. Figure 1 shows that the botnet
is still actively mining Monero coins for the attacker at the time of writing this
paper. We contacted the administrator of this pool and asked them to block the
suspicious wallet address. It should be noted that this botnet is generating 2400
H/s (hashes per second), where one Raspberry Pi can only generate 8 to 10 H/s.
This means that for this wallet, the botnet comprises some 3000 machines or
more that are also being targeted by the same cyber criminal group.
Cash out Figure 1 shows that the criminals managed to mine 45 XMR with
an accumulated hash rate of 2400 H/s. Since Monero’s dollar value as of 01
September 2017 was 140 USD, this means the attacker received 6,300 USD in
three months and paid to this wallet address.
For contrast, Symantec reported that Darlloz mined 42,438 Dogecoins (ap-
prox. 46 USD in 2014) and 282 Mincoins (approx. 150 USD in 2014) using an
7 https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iot-worm-used-mine-cryptocurrency
Fig. 1: Although the pool admin blocked payouts to the reported wallet address,
the botnet still mines Monero—not for the cyber criminals, but for the pool.
open source miner software. It should be noted that the value of these cryp-
tocurrencies and mining difficulty of Dogecoin was very low in 2014, and that
the price of Dogecoin increased by 976 percentage within three years. Therefore,
it is only logical and most rewarding for the cyber criminals to mine coins with
very low difficulty and keep it in the wallet till the currency value goes up.
4 Outlook
The advantages of malicious mining Malicious cryptocurrency mining
started as early as 2009—the year that Bitcoin was introduced. In the years
that followed, most criminals focused on banking trojans such as SpyEye and
(GameOver) Zeus. But mining malware also gained popularity among cyber
criminals who were, after all, already in the business of compromising PCs and
herding large numbers of them in botnets.
Meanwhile, other criminal activities also rose in popularity, especially ran-
somware—malware that encrypts a user’s data and holds it hostage until the
user pays the ransom money. Compared to banking trojans, they were less visi-
ble to the banks and the police. Specifically, the ransom amounts were small and
all money transfers were legitimate as far as the banks were concerned, and ini-
tiated by the users themselves. From previous studies [20], we know that around
3 percent of the victims pay the ransom—some 300 USD in Bitcoin. Thus, the
scheme revolves around the infection of many machines storing valuable user
data. Moreover, the payout per infection is a one-time amount of a few hun-
dred dollars. After that, many bots are ‘burned’ as users typically clean up their
systems to prevent further damage. Additionally, ransomware is noisy: if many
people get infected, many people talk about it [25,23,22]. Attracting attention
is not always good for the criminals.
No such limitations exist for cryptocurrency mining: a bot can easily mine
less common privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies to make all transactions un-
traceable from the start. Modern miners are now starting to target exactly these
kinds of cryptocurrencies.
Table 2: CPU Mineable altcoins
Coin Algorithm Exchanges
Boolberry Wild Keccack Poloniex, Bittrex
JackpotCoin JHA Bittrex, MintPal, Poloniex
MemoryCoin Momentum with SHA-512 Bter, Poloniex
YACoin Scrypt-YAC Cryptsy
Moneta Verde CryptoNight Poloniex
New Universal Dollar Bcrypt Bittrex
Riecoin Prime Constellations Poloniex, MintPal, BTC38
Slimcoin Dcrypt Bter
Darkcoin X11 MintPal, Poloniex, Bter
Givecoin X11 Bittrex
Global Denomination X11 Poloniex, Bittrex, AllCrypt
Hirocoin X11 MintPal, Poloniex, Bittrex
Logicoin X11 Poloniex
GroestlCoin Groestl Poloniex, MintPal
Aeon CryptoNight Poloniex, Swaphole
Bytecoin CryptoNight Poloniex, HitBTC
Ducknote CryptoNight Poloniex, Bittrex
Fantomcoin CryptoNight Poloniex, Bittrex
Monero CryptoNight Poloniex, Bittrex, MintPal
QuazarCoin CryptoNight Poloniex, Bittrex, Swaphole
In addition, unlike the one-time hit delivered by traditional ransomware or
banking trojans, cryptocurrency miners are designed to fly under the radar and
generate a continuous stream of revenue for their botmasters. They also do not
need to infect machines that contain valuable data or that are used for online
banking—every infected machine immediately contributes to generating profits.
Moreover, the miners steal money indirectly, as victims never transfer money
directly to a criminal’s account. Instead, they pay via their energy bills and the
performance loss of their devices. As a result, the damage is much less visible.
Finally, a growing wave of new cryptocurrencies make it profitable to mine
coins without specialized hardware, even if this is no longer feasible for currencies
such as Bitcoin. While cryptocurrencies appear and disappear continuously, the
cryptocurrency market capitalization is increasing exponentially [9], and altcoins
make up a sizable portion of the market (over 50% at the time of writing) and
are often still CPU mineable. In fact, we will show that even low-end IoT devices
are interesting targets for cryptocurrency mining.
Given the advantages and the increase in mining malware families in the
wild, a further proliferation of malicious cryptocurrency mining may perhaps be
expected.
Altcoin mining Our study of malicious miners in the previous section shows
that cyber criminals try to mine the most lucrative coin (easy to mine, un-
traceable and valuable) at that specific point in time. For instance, Bitcoin-
Miner.hxao, Mal/Miner-c, Adylkuzz and Sambacry and Shell.Miner are min-
ing Monero precisely because it is CPU mineable, untraceable and valuable.
Table 2 shows the list of CPU mineable coins that are actively traded today. Of
course, doing so, requires keeping an eye on the specific altcoins to mine, since
both the mining difficulty and the exchange rates change over time.
Infection vector Similar to any other class of malware, the malicious miner
can use any method to spread—phishing, drive-by-download, malvertising, so-
cial engineering or worm propagation. In the beginning of 2017, several families
of ransomware used worms as an infection vector. For instance, the WannaCry
ransomware infected more than 300 thousand devices, while Mirai and Bricker-
Bot infected millions of IoT devices. Now malicious miner families have started
copying this method of spreading to reach as many victims as possible. Another
approach (actively discussed on underground forums, these days) is to buy bots
for negligible prices on the underground markets and utilize them for malicious
mining’ purposes. Finally, a recent report [10] showed that browser-based mining
malware now spreads via malvertising. In this case, the criminal buys the traffic
from advertisement networks to serve JavaScript-based mining scripts to users’
browsers (instead of serving ads). This form of mining is known as web mining.
Later in this section, we discuss the profitability of this business model.
Devices targeted Our study shows that currently most of the malicious min-
ers are targeting high-end machines. Nevertheless, we also see significant mining
on low-end machines, and here, the criminals are targeting IoT devices more
than mobile devices, even though mobile devices usually have more computa-
tion power. The ease of infection and the high likelihood of staying hidden,
are probably the main reasons. With a worm component, it is easier to infect
hundreds of thousands or even millions of IoT devices. For instance, Mirai and
BrickerBot infected up to tens of millions of IoT devices [24,4]. We also saw
Shell.Miner generating 2400 H/s. A recent report by Intel on the IoT forecasts
200 billion connected devices by 2020 [1]. Most of these IoT devices have stable
internet connectivity, even compared to mobile devices—enabling the attacker
to mine on them throughout the day. Finally, for an average user, it is harder to
detect a miner running on her security camera or Raspberry Pi device than to
detect a malicious app on her mobile devices.
Mining Components Another interesting finding is that all the malicious
miners are using a free version of legitimate CPUminer software. The open source
version of CPUminers are optimized to give maximum results, and from a profit
perspective it thus makes senses that malicious miners also make use of these
solutions. Moreover, all miners are using the same pool communication protocol,
i.e. the Stratum protocol. In our investigation, we did find that several families
tried to obfuscate the mining components, presumably to evade signature-based
detection.
Profit When it comes to profit, the specific altcoin to mine plays a crucial
role. At the time of writing, our analysis shows that Monero altcoin is the best
candidate to mine on high-end machines, and on IoT devices with a stable inter-
net connection. ByteCoin (BCN) is a good candidate to mine on mobile devices
because it has comparatively lower difficulty than Monero, while still offering
significant monetary value, as well as privacy.
Table 3: Miner component used by malware in our dataset
Malware family Miner component Obfuscated version
Mal/Miner-C Claymore’s CryptoNote CPU Miner v3.5 Yes
BitcoinMiner.hxao MinerGate Admin edition No
Kagecoin CPU Miner 2.3.2 No
Adylkuzz CPU Miner 2.3.3 8 Yes
SambaCry CPU Miner 2.3.3 No
Shell.Miner CPU Miner Multi No
A PC can yield somewhere between 30 H/s and 300 H/s if it is mining a
CryptoNote-based cryptocurrency. Table 4 shows the result of our experiments
on different devices. A botnet usually consists of PCs with different computation
power. Let us conservatively assume a botnet consist only of low-end PCs that
can generate at least 30 H/s each. In that case, each bot generates at least .0007
Monero coins per day [6,18]. With 10,000 bots, this botnet generates at least 854
USD per day. Similarly, if a botnet in the IoT consists of devices that generate
9H/s, each device contributed some 7.5 BCN per day. Similarly, for IoT devices
let’s assume, on average, one device generates 9 H/s. This means a device can
generate at least 7.5 BCN. On 01 September 2017, the value of BCN was 0.0024
USD which means it is possible to make at least 180 USD per day using a botnet
of 10 thousand devices with similar computational power. Note that such botnet
sizes are considered very small.
Let us now consider the case where cyber criminals hire a botnet for mali-
cious cryptocurrency mining which at least in theory, is an easy to set-up crim-
inal business model. While these botnets are generally offered as—-ironically
named—booters and stressors to perform DDoS-attacks, some botnets also offer
the possibility to use them for other purposes. Two separate studies by respec-
tively Verisign and WebRoot show that it is possible to rent botnets and they
discuss pricing on specific underground markets [32,8]. In the study done by
Verisign, analyzing 25 underground market botnet renting offerings, they con-
clude that renting out a botnet of 10 thousand bots costs 67 USD per 24-hour
window. This means, renting 10 thousand bots for 67 USD to mine Monero offers
a very good profit margin, assuming the botnet use is exclusive.
Finally, let us estimate the profit that can be gained by web mining. Coin-
hive [5] is a legitimate online service which offers a JavaScript miner for the Mon-
ero blockchain that webmasters can embed in their website to monetize the vis-
itors’ computation power. At the time of writing, Coinhive provides 0.00016414
XMR per 1M hashes, while charging 30% fees. We can use this service as a basis
for evaluating this business model. From experiments, we find that a PC-based
browser yields 10 to 60 H/s depending on its computation power. So let us as-
sume, on average, a PC yields 20 H/s which means 10 thousand users visiting
a website for 5 minutes generates 60M hashes which are equivalent to 1.3 USD.
In comparison, a website can generate 2.7 times more money by displaying one
popup ad to 10 thousand visitors9. It would seem that web mining is only prof-
9 http://paypopup.com/advertising packages.php
itable for websites that bind many visitors for a long time, such as perhaps sites
that stream movies or sports events, or that host online games, as discussed
in [12].
Cashing out without getting caught Some malicious cryptocurrency miners
use a configuration file hardcoded in the binary that specifies things like the
cryptocurrency to mine, the pool server to use, and the wallet address to credit.
Others use a dynamic configuration file which they download from a control and
command server at start-up time. In the latter case, the botmaster has a chance
to update the configuration file, e.g., with a new wallet address in case the old
wallet address gets blocked by the mining pool. Interestingly, some mining pools
provide APIs to find out how much cryptocurrency it has paid to a particular
wallet address. For instance, we used these APIs to find out how many coins
Shell.Miner had mined. After discussing with two pool administrators from two
different pool servers, we realized that pool admins may not care about cyber
criminals using botnets for cryptocurrency mining, as in any case, it increases
the pool’s profit. Interestingly, even though one pool administrator eventually
blocked payouts to the wallet address that we found in the Shell.Miner binary,
the botnet is still mining Monero coins—not for the cyber criminals, but for the
pool (Figure 1)!
In order to not get blocked by the mining pool, some malicious miners, such
as BadLepricon, use proxy pool server [28]. In this case, bots contact the proxy
server to get jobs and submit shares. The proxy server forwards the requests and
shares to the appropriate pool server with the attackers’ credentials (including
the wallet address). Thus, an analyst studying the malware cannot find the
attackers’ wallet address at all, as this is only specified at the proxy server,
under the control of the attacker.
Another approach to avoid getting flagged by authorities is to use a mining
pool that does not provide any details about its users. For instance, we showed
that BitcoinMiner.hxao uses the MinerGate pool by specifying only the email
address of the attacker on the victim’s device. Analysts cannot find how many
coins this botnet mined without knowing the password of that account, or with-
out the support from the pool administrators. The analyst can only report the
email address to the administrators, hoping they will at least block the payout
to that account. Moreover, our research shows that even with the support from
pool administrators, it is impossible to catch the cyber criminals if they are
mining untraceable coins like Monero.
If for some reason (e.g., because they hope that the value of a specific coin will
explode in the future), cyber criminals insist on mining a cryptocurrency that
provides limited privacy, they can still trade the mined currencies for privacy-
preserving currencies using anonymous exchanges such as Shapeshift [27]. Such
exchanges allow anyone to trade cryptocurrency instantaneously without regis-
tering with them. Depending on the market value of the coin, the attacker can
then cash out from any exchange without any legal problems.
Table 4: Device benchmark : Coin value fluctuates
Device type CPU Hashes per second Bytecoin per day
AMD FX-8350 Eight core 4.0GHz 320 250
PC Intel Core i7-3770k 3.5 Ghz 250 195
Intel Core i5-3470 3.2GHz 170 134
Quad-core (2x2.15 GHz Kryo & 2x1.6 GHz Kryo) 20 15
Mobile Quad-core 2.3 GHz Krait 400 15 11
1.2 GHz quad-core Cortex-A7 8 6
IoT Raspberry Pi 3 9 7
Detection Detecting most of the current cryptocurrency miners is fairly
straightforward, and our study identified various conspicuous features, such as
1) the reuse of open source version of miners, 2) the clear-text communication
protocol, and 3) specific permissions and native code usage in Android miners.
All of these could be used to flag a system as suspicious. However, we can not
rely on these characteristics for the future, as malware authors can easily change
their code to not exhibit them. Instead, we should look for more fundamental
properties that would be extremely hard for malware authors to hide. In par-
ticular, properties such the recurring high CPU load, power consumption, and
heat generation. Also, for some devices (e.g., on the IoT), we could detect suspi-
cious communication patterns. Measuring these properties may help an anomaly
detector determine that a cryptocurrency miner is present.
5 Related Work
Previous studies [11,15] on cryptocurrency mining claim that mining is less prof-
itable than other malicious activities, such as spamming or booter-renting (DDoS
for hire) and should be used as a secondary monetizing scheme. These studies fo-
cus on botnets that were used to mine Bitcoin during the year 2011–2013. There
are no reports of these botnets being used for cryptocurrency mining in the last
couple of years, which implies they may not be active anymore. However, our
research focuses on all types of malicious cryptocurrency miners, including web
miners that are targeting three different platforms – PCs, mobile devices and
IoT devices. We also show how this threat evolved along with the evolution of
the cryptocurrency market and reached a state where malicious cryptocurrency
mining has become a highly profitable, and relatively safe and silent strategy for
cybercriminals.
A recent report [16] from Kaspersky supports our finding by showing that
the number of cryptocurrency miner attacks detected in the first eight months
of 2017 seems on track to exceed that of 2016. Another study [10] shows that
a new cryptocurrency mining malware is found to be using malvertising as the
infection vector. However, we show that web mining through malvertising is not
profitable in the case where victims spend very little time online.
Finally, a different yet related line of work, MineGuard [31], shows that it is
possible to detect covert mining operations in cloud platforms. MineGuard serves
as a hypervisor tool based on hardware-assisted behavioral monitoring, which
accurately detects the signature of a miner. Similar signature-based detection
can be used to detect malicious cryptocurrency miners targeting PCs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the phenomenon of malicious cryptocurrency mining.
Compared to just a few years ago, such activities have become more interesting
to cyber criminals. We analyzed the current families of these malicious miners
on several platforms, as well as the developments in the cryptocurrency mar-
kets that have removed some of the barriers for malware to profit from mining.
We have seen that even compromised low-end devices can now lucratively mine
cryptocurrencies for criminals. The result of our study shows that it makes eco-
nomic sense (again) for attackers to invest in this type of activity. We cautiously
predict that we may expect a proliferation of such attacks in the near future.
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